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ABSTRACT 
It is hypothesized that pursuit of human happiness is carried out through adaptive change in utility 
functions by drawing lessons from, in an ex-post manner, the effect of short run utility maximizing 
choices on utility possibilities. A reference frame for future research is designed to check the truth of 
this hypothesis which would draw on the methodology already in use for conducting happiness surveys. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PROLOGUE: CONTRADICTIONS AND CONNECTIONS BETWEEN UTILITY 
MAXIMIZATION AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 
Utility can be defined in two ways (the discussion of these two types that follows is based 
on 1). The first one corresponds to ‘decision utility’ or ‘wantability’ – an ex-ante ranking of 
preferences used to make choices. Utility is revealed by actual choice in this case – when an 
individual faced with a range of options actually makes a choice then that choice is revealed 
to be utility maximising over the mentioned range. The second notion of utility is in the 
nature of ‘experienced utility’ and was formulated by utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham. 
They claimed that this notion – which disappeared from practical use by the beginning of the 
20
th century – was very similar to happiness. Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics 2 even 
went so far as to define happiness as the temporal integral of momentary experienced utility. 
But is our own conception of utility immutable during our lifetime? Or does it exhibit 
dynamism as we flounder or progress in the achievement of happiness? I feel that such 
questions are worth answering if the process of ‘utility maximisation’ – one that economists 
lay so much stress on – is to be linked to the pursuit of happiness, which is arguably the 
objective of human life. 
The objective of this paper is to sketch out a research agenda that would add greater insight to 
our understanding regarding whether, to what extent and how the process of utility 
maximisation is linked to the pursuit of happiness. In what follows we show through 
illustrations/thought experiments that evolutionary mechanisms might possibly link utility 
maximisation and happiness. By ‘evolution’ we do not refer here to the evolution of a 
population cohort or species over time. Rather we refer to the evolution of an individual (his 
behavioural patterns and therefore his preferences) over his life time. Given the possibility of 
the mentioned linkages, we design a research agenda to find out whether such mechanisms 
are actually active and significant in reality. 
A possible hypothesis is that an individual might change his preference ordering in response 
to the wisdom gathered from the cumulative impact on his happiness of the interaction among 
his own ‘momentary utility maximizing choices’, the reactions of the outside world to the 
mentioned choices, and external circumstances which affect the individual but do not arise 
from his own actions. When viewed in this manner, the very process of utility maximization 
results in a tuning of utility functions in the pursuit of happiness. Assuming a broad positive 
correlation between rankings of ‘wantability’ and experienced utility and neglecting factors 
that might drive a wedge between these
1, the rankings of experienced utility from various 
choices would also change over the course of a person’s lifetime. 
THE POSSIBILITY THAT UTILITY MAXIMISATION MAY ALSO BE A MEANS TO 
AN END: A DEEPER EXPLORATION 
Economists generally view utility maximisation as an end in itself. But can we look upon it as 
an evolutionary process which is a means to an end? To put things very simply, there is this 
concept of happiness – we can feel it but often we do not know what drives its increase or 
decrease, at least during the beginning of our lives or even our youth. What satisfies us 
momentarily is however easier to choose – when presented with a menu in a restaurant we can 
pick out the food item which offers us the best possible satisfaction within our budget; when 
given a choice of practising on the piano or going out for a movie with friends we may again 
find it quite easy to make the choice which gives us higher momentary experienced utility. S. Mitra 
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But here lies the trick. If we keep our utility functions fixed, the maximisation of these not 
only affects experienced utility but in conjunction with external circumstances and the 
reactions of others and ‘nature’ to our actions affect our utility possibilities in the future, 
sometimes adversely so – as examples would point out. But if, as Edgeworth pointed out, 
happiness is the temporal integral of experienced utilities then utility maximisation on the 
basis of an unchanged utility function is not possibly the best means for maximising 
happiness or even for obtaining satisfactory happiness outcomes. 
Let us give some examples at this stage to show that utility maximisation on the basis of a 
given utility function might lead an individual to a very unhappy state of affairs. 
Example 1: In period 1 a person might find it better from the point of view of maximising 
immediate utility to hang out with his friends after school instead of learning to play the 
piano or cultivating a reading habit. Imagine that he or his friends have to move to another 
city at the end of period 1. Now consider period 2 as the present. Had the person devoted 
some time to playing the piano or cultivating a reading habit in period 1 at the expense of 
time spent in hanging out with his friends, in the present he would have recourse to an activity 
from which he could derive satisfaction in solitude by being absorbed in it. But he does not and 
neither does he have access to close friends. He therefore experiences very low levels of immediate 
utility even if he is a utility maximizer. In other words, he becomes a very unhappy person. 
Example 2: A person might lead a very bohemian lifestyle in period 1 – working hard and 
playing hard. He might have numerous girl friends at the same time; indulge in late night 
parties characterised by heavy drinking; and at the same time make additions to his wealth by 
working quite hard in office. Over a short period of time (i.e. throughout period 1) these might 
feel like the right choices as the momentary satisfaction experienced would be very high. But 
even if we assume that immediate satisfaction is maximized, gradually such behaviour might 
take a toll on physical and mental health, which from the point of view of the individual 
might affect his ability to experience pleasure as well as be absorbed in activities in period 2. 
There also might be reactions to his behaviour in period 1 in period 2 – his numerous girl 
friends, for example, when they find out about each other and his lack of loyalty might feel 
malice towards him and their reactions might have a rebound effect on his mental health. 
Positive feelings such as courage, optimism and hope might take a beating in period 2. 
Here we are assuming that individuals cannot display perfect foresight in maximising lifetime 
utility as they cannot factor in external reactions to their own actions, the impact of their 
actions on their own sensory systems, and above all external circumstances which affect their 
utility possibilities in conjunction with the previous two factors. If utility depends only on the 
temporal income and wealth profile which in turn depends on allocation of time among 
various competing uses alone then perfect foresight regarding income streams flowing from 
various alternative temporal allocative profiles – an assumption which might approximate 
reality – could be used for accurate dynamic utility optimisation. But in this paper we are 
looking at a much broader conception of utility, with greater applicability to overall human 
behaviour, which extends to the emotional space. Given that no unique correspondence can 
be drawn between the level of income or wealth and the vector of emotions, perfect foresight 
might not be very easily applicable in regard to this broader conception of utility. 
To summarise, once we consider utility functions that depend on factors other than income or 
wealth, perfect or ‘close to perfect’ foresight about utility profiles would not be possible in 
reality. In such cases, past history about actions taken, reactions of the types mentioned above 
to these, and utility levels experienced could be useful for the evolution of utility functions. 
And if utility functions are to evolve, surely they would evolve such that their maximisation 
leads us to greater happiness. Utility maximisation as a pathway for maximisation of happiness 
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The above examples establish that short term utility maximisation on the basis of a fixed utility 
function might not maximise the sum of utilities i.e. happiness. In fact, such maximization 
can lead to very low levels of experienced happiness. In Example 1, one can imagine that if 
the person concerned had even devoted an hour daily in the initial period to practising on the 
piano and therefore spent an hour less in hanging out with his friends, his utility in the initial 
period would have gone down by an amount far less than the increase in utility caused by the 
recourse to a pleasurable activity in the second period. Not only would the sum of utilities 
occurring through utility maximisation be far lower than that occurring through a non ‘utility 
maximising’ choice, utility maximisation in the first period leads the person concerned to a 
choice set in the second period where the highest level of utility attainable is low
2. 
Note here that the individual does not foresee the change in external circumstances i.e. his 
friends going away. In other words, the ‘utility maximisation’ we refer to here is utility 
maximisation without that kind of foresight. Similarly, in Example 2 the utility maximisation 
followed by individual 2 does not take note of adverse biological reactions of his own body to 
lack of sleep and alcohol; and possible reactions of others (his numerous girl friends in this 
case) in period 2 to his actions towards them in period 1. If utility maximisation displays such 
foresight, which is assumed to be absent in Examples 1 and 2, then utility maximisation by 
the individual is consistent with the maximisation of the temporal integral of utilities i.e. 
happiness in the sense of Edgeworth. 
Casual empiricism seems to suggest that such foresight does not exist to the extent that it can 
be deemed as ‘perfect’ or even nearly so. However, to what extent it exists is something 
which deserves evaluation through research. To the extent it does not exist, the following 
research question is also of great significance as mentioned before: do individuals tune their 
utility functions in response to attained levels of happiness under varied circumstances and is 
such tuning significant? 
In the next section we look at the newly emerging field of positive psychology. This field has 
outlined the components of happiness. We explore these components and outline what ‘lack of 
foresight’ and ‘tuning of utility functions’ mean in terms of the vocabulary of positive psychology. 
POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INSIGHTS OFFERED ABOUT 
THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 
Quite recently, study of how changes in one’s life style can affect one’s level of well being 
has become the preoccupation of a fast emerging field of clinical psychology which goes by 
the label of ‘positive psychology’ (see 3 for an introduction to positive psychology). 
Practitioners of positive psychology have defined happiness as being made up of three 
components: positive emotions (i.e. feelings of forgiveness, contentment and satisfaction with 
reference to the past; savouring of pleasures, kindness, and compassion in the present; and 
courage and optimism for the future); the ability to be completely absorbed in an activity 
often referred to as ‘flow’ (for example, professional activities such as teaching, pleasurable 
activities such as listening to music, and household chores such as repairing a bicycle or 
decorating one’s house for a festival); and the satisfaction derived in working for a higher 
good which is above one’s narrow self interest 4. 
In terms of the above concepts, part of the deviation from perfect foresight might be 
accounted for by the failure to incorporate, while choosing a vector of actions from the set of 
possible action vectors, the impact of present actions on the components of future happiness 
such as the attainment of flow; and retrospective emotions such as contentment and 
satisfaction. Such deviation implies that an individual defines his own utility in terms of 
current emotions or even more narrowly, the savouring of pleasures. S. Mitra 
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But while such deviations from perfect foresight do result in deviations from optimal happiness, 
adaptive mechanisms which correct for such deviation from optimality are not ruled out. 
Thus, an important question is whether it is possible that over time our utility functions 
evolve to incorporate hitherto ignored components of happiness through ‘learning by doing’. 
For example, a person who initially incorporates only the savouring of pleasures in his utility 
function might incorporate ‘flow’ in it or give importance to emotions relating to the past as a 
result of life’s experiences or by learning from the actions of others in similar circumstances. 
There are others who might incorporate the satisfaction gained from social service. 
Let us refer back to our examples. In Example 2, we can see that an individual ends up 
impairing his material and physical health through the static maximisation of a fixed utility 
function. This can be attributed to a lack of foresight about how his own utility maximising 
choices (late night parties and heavy drinking in combination with self inflicted work related 
strains) affect his sensory systems (his knowledge of the intricacies of human biology might 
be poor) and about the reactions of the outside world (for example, those of his numerous girl 
friends whom he dated at the same time) to his actions. Thus, the mentioned process of utility 
maximisation could take him to a rock bottom level of happiness. When that rock bottom level 
of happiness is reached we can hypothesize that a process of introspection is stimulated as 
survival instincts of the individual take over to bring back his levels of happiness to respectable 
levels. Having experienced the consequences of his actions, the cause and effect relationships 
underlying ‘happiness outcomes’ become clearer. For example, he realises the disastrous 
consequences of having multiple girl friends at the same time and becomes devoted to a single 
partner; he realises that late nights and the alcohol consumed at late night parties has resulted in 
a numbing of the senses whose reversal would require a drastic change in behaviour patterns – 
no more late night parties etc. Having reached this rock bottom level of happiness he may seek 
counselling and find solace in pursuing a hobby such as playing the piano or social service. 
What is being emphasised here is that a hard lesson is learnt by the individual in question and 
this convinces him to change his habits so radically that in the future he experiences very 
high levels of happiness. The causal link therefore is as follows: nature of utility function that 
causes him to leas a bohemian strenuous life  rocks bottom levels of happiness  drastic 
change in lifestyle  very high levels of happiness. 
What is interesting in this example is that the utility function in the beginning is very 
important. For had that not existed the temporal utility profile leading to rock bottom levels 
of happiness would not have been experienced and the radical change in utility function and 
thus behaviour and experienced happiness would not have been brought about. Many 
individuals probably lead ‘regular’ or ‘ordinary’ or ‘uninteresting lives’ and in that sense are 
quite different from the portrayed individual. But because their happiness does not reach rock 
bottom they do not feel the need to introspect on their behaviour. And therefore they continue 
to be averagely happy throughout their life. 
In Example 1, a similar learning by doing might be experienced. The individual initially has a 
utility function in which savouring of present pleasures is important. He also displays very 
poor foresight as to how actions in period 1 can help in the attainment of ‘flow’ in period 2 
and thus augment his happiness – he thus fails to derive little satisfaction in period 1 from 
such activities. But the maximisation of such a utility function in conjunction with change in 
circumstances (his close friends moving away) lead to very poor utility possibilities in period 2. 
His happiness reaching rock bottom levels again prompts introspection as to whether an 
alternative course of action could have been better. The possible gains from alternative 
courses of action, such as those that correspond to investments in ‘flow’, would become 
evident if the experiences of others are closely examined or counselling sought. Such Utility maximisation as a pathway for maximisation of happiness 
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introspection and examination might lead to a change in life style – a balance is therefore 
probably struck between flow promoting activities and social interaction. 
Note that the inability to foresee a change in external circumstances (such as friends moving 
away) also constitutes a deviation from perfect foresight. Here, too, a different sort of 
adaptation might come into play – as an individual experiences different circumstances he 
might be better able to evaluate the range of variation of these and make choices which would 
yield satisfactory outcomes in regard to happiness under different possible circumstances. For 
example, an individual who hones his skills at social interaction and in a hobby ensures that 
he ends up at least reasonably happy irrespective of whether chances for social interaction 
present themselves or not, and at the same time ensures that he makes full use of these 
happiness augmenting opportunities when they do. 
IN CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
Recent experimental research in economics on happiness seeks to measure the level of 
happiness in people by asking them to choose a non-negative integer i , on a n point scale, 
which signifies the level of agreement with an appropriate statement, such that a higher value 
of i implies a higher level of happiness. Thus, what is presented through the statement is an 
ordinal scale of happiness with the individual asked to place himself on it. 
A prominent example of the above is the single-item question on a three-point scale in 5 
which asks: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days-would you say that 
you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” In the World Values Survey, life 
satisfaction is assessed on a scale from one (dissatisfied) to ten (satisfied) 6, which asks: 
“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” 
Such surveys have been shown to be reasonably accurate. Following 7 we can claim that 
errors in people’s responses are random and cancel out due to the law of large numbers. This 
also holds true for errors caused by the order of questions, the wording of questions, and 
actual mood. In regard to the research problems posed above we can ask the following 
specific research questions: Consider those individuals who have transited from very low 
levels of happiness to high levels of happiness as revealed by longitudinal surveys. Is the 
proportion of such individuals in the population significantly high? Is such a transition a 
result of a change in lifestyles to a significant extent or can it be explained primarily by a 
change in socio-economic determinants such as income, marital status etc; or can it be 
attributed to the interaction between changes in socio-economic factors and lifestyle or the 
former emerging from the latter? 
In regard to the first question we need to define what constitutes a significant jump in 
happiness. For example, we may say that any person who has recorded a 2 point increase on a 3 
point ordinal scale of happiness or a 6 point increase on a 10 point ordinal scale of happiness 
can be deemed as having registered a significant increase in happiness. The numbers 2 and 6 
are just illustrative. Researchers need to devote adequate thought to these numbers. 
In regard to the second question, it deserves mention that a change in lifestyle and socio-
economic determinants might be quite correlated. For example, a person who learns through 
life’s experiences will change his lifestyle with age. If we regress happiness on age we may 
expect a positive effect though this is the same as that provided by the change in lifestyle 
stimulated by life’s experiences (or in more technical terms the ‘evolution of the utility 
function’). The same may be true of marital status 8. Exhaustive case studies of the persons 
who have experienced significant increases in happiness are therefore required to single out 
the root cause of this increase – lessons learnt from life and the consequent conscious change S. Mitra 
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in lifestyles which might or might not result in any change in socio-economic variables under 
study; or a change in socio-economic variables that has got nothing to do with any conscious 
design to change one’s lifestyle. 
REMARKS 
1Kahneman and Thaler 1 make the point that the choices that maximize ‘wantability’ might 
1not be optimal from the point of view of ‘experienced utility’. They specifically 
1elaborate on the nature of change in circumstances from-to, where the former is the point 
1of time at which choices are made and the latter is the point of time at which outcomes of 
1choice are experienced, such as change in emotional or motivational state of the agent; and 
1change in the aspects of the outcome on which there is focus at these two points of time (say 
1aesthetics of the purchased item versus its functional use). 
2In 3 a similar argument is made: under many circumstances it 
1might be better to withhold 
2maximization of immediate enjoyment of pleasures at a given
1point of time. 
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MAKSIMIZIRANJE KORISNOSTI KAO 
NAČIN MAKSIMIZIRANJA SREĆE 
S. Mitra
Ekonomski odsjek, Sveučilište Jadavpur 
Kolkata, India 
SAŽETAK 
Postavljena je hipoteza kako se ljudska potraga za srećom odvija adaptivnim promjenama funkcije korisnosti 
izvlačenjem lekcija na temelju učinaka kratkoročnih izbora maksimiziranja korisnosti među mogućim ishodima. 
Za provjeru hipoteze postavljen je okvir budućih istraživanja koja će se koristiti metodologiju koja se već koristi 
u provođenju istraživanja sreće. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI 
sreća, maksimiziranje korisnosti 